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Governance Structure and Hospital Performance in Tennessee
Chul-Young Roh* and M. Jae Moon**
Abstract: It is critical for a hospital to perform efficiently, to provide quality health
care, and to maintain a high reputation in the community that the hospital serves.
Since hospital governing boards are charged with ensuring superior performance
on the part of the hospital, it is important to understand the features of governing
boards that contribute positively to hospital performance. This study investigates
the relationship between hospital governance and hospital performance in 
Tennessee. It measures the performance of 125 community hospitals from 2008
to 2012 using data envelopment analysis (DEA). This study finds that hospitals
that adopt a corporate governance model perform better than hospitals that
embrace a philanthropic one.
Keywords: measurement of efficiency, data envelopment analysis (DEA), hospital
governance
INTRODUCTION
Hospital governing boards are critical in influencing the performance of hospitals
and are a crucial component of health care delivery in the United States. Governance is
defined as the process of overseeing the functions and performance of an organization
by defining the organization’s mission, values, and vision through laws, norms, power,
or language (Bevir, 2013). It encompasses accountability and responsibility for the
overall management of the organization. Specifically, health care governance could be
considered a process of senior-level leadership and decision-making by a board of
directors, CEO, senior managers, and clinical leaders.
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Most hospitals have their own governing board, which is the axis of hospital gover-
nance (Eeckloo, Van Herck, Van Hulle, & Vleugels, 2004). The governing board is
charged with the responsibility of developing both strategic plans and short-term 
policies, motivating departments to meet their targeted managerial and clinical goals and
evaluating their performance, and serving internal and external stakeholders (Taylor,
2000). The way a governing board is run and how it is structured affects how effectively
it functions. Some studies (Young, Beekun, & Ginn, 1992; Alexander, Zuckerman, &
Pointer, 1995; Buchner, 2012; Prybil, 2006; Gu, Langabeer, & Helton, 2010) have
examined the relationship between hospital performance and the characteristics of
hospital governing boards, focusing on such factors as board size, board composition,
clinical staff participation in governing boards, types of board leadership, and board
diversity.
Given the escalating competition among hospitals and the demand to ensure the
best use of limited resources, it is critical to explore the relationship between hospital
performance and its governance. In this study, performance refers to the conversion of
inputs into outputs relative to best practice. In a perfect performance, there would be
zero loss of inputs in producing a given quantity of output. A decision-making unit
(DMU) operating at best practice level is 100%, efficient, which is indicated by 1.
This study examines the relationship between the overall performance of community
hospitals in Tennessee and hospital governance. Community hospitals occupy a
unique position in providing health care services in vulnerable economic environments,
and community hospitals in Tennessee encompass a wide range of different characteris-
tics ranging across hospital ownership, hospital size, location, and network participation
and so offer a good pool for exploring the relationship between hospital performance
and governance types.
In examining the relationship between the performance and governance of commu-
nity hospitals in Tennessee, this study uses data envelopment analysis (DEA). DEA is
appropriate for analysis of the hospital industry, since it provides multiple outputs for
multiple inputs, which rarely can capture price information. This study is structured 
as follows. First, we offer a review of the relevant empirical studies on relationships
between hospital performance and its governance and follow it with a description of
hospital governance models. The research method section specifies DEA and describes
the input and output variables and data sources used in this study. The findings section
explores the governance model that influences the performance of community hospitals
in Tennessee. The discussion section presents our conclusions and provides suggestions
for future research.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Previous studies have shown that the performance of hospitals is influenced by the
characteristics of their governing boards, including such factors as board size, level of
participation of medical staff, CEO duality, and composition and board diversity.
Some studies (Kovner, 1990; Lipton & Lorsch 1992; Jenson, 1993; Bader, 1991) have
explored the relationship between the size of the governing board and performance.
Smaller governing boards improved performance in areas such as timely decision
making and the securing of commitments compared to larger governing boards
(Kovner, 1990; Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found that if the
size of the governing board has more than 10 members, then it is more difficult for the
opinions of all members to be heard. Jensen (1993) found that smaller governing
boards improved hospital performance and that governing boards with more than eight
members are less likely to perform effectively, since larger governing boards introduce
added coordination costs and free-rider problems among governing board members.
Bader (1991) has suggested that the optimal size for a governing board to function
effectively is 15.
Reviewing the health care literature on the question of the ideal size for governing
boards, Delbecq and Gill (1988) found that health care leaders believe that smaller-
sized governing board are preferable for the development of strategic plans. The
smaller the size of governing board within a system, the greater the possibility that the
governing board will remain focused on the hospital and board member roles within 
it rather than being distracted by organization-specific issues. In his survey of 1,400
German hospitals, Buchner (2012) found that board size has a negative relation to
financial performance and suggests the size of a governing board should not exceed a
critical threshold, since a larger governing board might be inefficient in decision making.
The composition of governing boards (the proportion of external to internal members)
gives a further indication of hospital performance. It indicates the level of independence
of the governing board. External governing board members represent shareholders or
members of the community, while internal ones include the CEO and senior medical
staff. Internal governing board members are more familiar with the dynamics of the
organization, while external ones can bring new expertise and change into the organi-
zation. Jermias (2007) argues that the independence of governing boards has a negative
effect on performance, concluding that the internal governing board members are in 
a better position than external governing board members to motivate and supervise
hospital management. Fama and Jensen (1983) and Jensen (1993), on the other hand,
argue that a higher number of external governing board members provides a better
forum for decision making and has a positive influence on performance. Conger,
Does Governance Affect Organizational Performance? 25
The Korean Journal of Policy Studies
Lawler, and Finegold (2001) found that governing boards whose internal members
made up less tan 10% of the total number of members were able to develop external
relationships and internal strategic roles more effectively than boards composed of a
higher percentage of internal members.
Medical staff members are asked to join governing boards to provide expertise
regarding health care services and delivery issues. Medical staff participation on a
governing board can enhance the performance of the hospital, especially in the area of
clinical performance. Alexander et al. (1995) argue that medical staff participation in
governing boards may reduce the possibility of conflicts arising between the interests
of the hospital and those of the professional staff. Medical staff participation on gov-
erning boards can provide governing boards with the information needed to enhance
the efficiency of the hospital (Young, Beekun, & Ginn, 1992). In their examination of
131 hospitals, Shortell and LoGerfo (1981) found that medical staff participation on
governing boards positively affects hospital performance, primarily in the area of 
surgical mortality rate. Other studies (Molinari, Morlock, Alexander, & Lyles, 1993;
Goes & Zhan, 1995) also have found that medical staff involvement on governing
boards is the most effective method for improving hospital performance. Prybil (2006)
and Gu et al. (2010) also argue that better-performing hospitals have a higher proportion
of medical staff who have a vote on governing boards.
The structure of the governing board is a critical determinant of hospital performance.
Some governing boards are chaired by the hospital CEO, while others are not. Molinari
et al. (1997) found that CEO participation on governing boards enhanced the financial
performance of hospitals, while Fama and Jensen (1983), Sanders and Carpenter
(1998) and Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997) found that CEO duality reduced the
CEO’s effectiveness in monitoring top management. Board diversity is shaped by the
gender, ethnicity, age, religion, occupation, education, and so forth of board members,
variables that can affect decision making (Carter, Simkins, & Simpson, 2003). The
degree of diversity among the members of a governing board, including the percentage
of women and minorities, has been identified as a critical factor how well an organiza-
tion performs. Burke (1997), Singh, Vinnicombe, and Johnson (2001) and Carter et al.
(2003) argue that there is a positive relationship between the diversity of a governing
board and organizational performance.
HOSPITAL GOVERNANCE MODELS
Flynn (2002) defines clinical governance as the control process that establishes the
functions and measures the performance of an organization by defining the organiza-
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tion’s mission, vision, and values. Governance models help clarify the structure of
governing boards and their relationship with internal and external stakeholders (Carver,
1990).
Several governance models have been developed. The policy-driven governance
model created by Carver (1990), is premised on the idea that the board of directors is
empowered to assume accountability for the organizations that it governs. This gover-
nance model can be applied to the governing board of any organization. It is designed
to encourage boards to focus on the larger issues, to clearly delegate responsibility, to
oversee the work of the management team without meddling, and to strictly evaluate the
accomplishments of the organization. The governing board clearly leads its organization.
Pound (1995) focuses on decision-making processes in developing a governance
model, theorizing two types of governance models: the managed corporation governance
model and the governed corporation model. In the managed corporation governance
model, the role of the governing board is to monitor and control management. The
governed corporation model, on the other hand, focuses not so much on the competence
of management as on the effectiveness of the organization. The decision-making process
of the governed corporation model is more robust, pluralistic, and adaptable. This 
governance model requires a board of directors with expertise and competency to
work in an environment that fosters open debate.
Chait, Ryan, and Taylor (2005) define governance as leadership. They have devel-
oped three types of governance models: one that emphasizes fiduciary responsibility
or stewardship of assets, one that emphasizes collaborating with management to
develop a vision for the organization’s future, and one that emphasizes cooperation
between the board of directors and management to resolve the issues that the organiza-
tion confronts. The third one, the generative governance model, is more engaging and
reflective than the other two. It provides the governing board members, who act as
leaders for the organization, with a greater sense of purpose than any other type of
governance model.
Charan (2005) has developed a governance model based on the evolutionary process
organizations go through. In the first phase, the governing board is ceremonial. The
governing board performs its duties in a perfunctory ways. In the second phase, senior
managers come to dominate the governing board, and scandals ensue. The governing
board is liberated in the third phase; at this point, the board of directors assumes a
more active role in governance. In the last phase, the governing board embraces a
more cohesive and collective approach to problem solving that adds value to the orga-
nization. Charan argues that the type of progressive governance that characterizes the
fourth phase leads to better governance through the focus on group dynamics, proper
information architecture, and substantive issues that it encourages.
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Using information culled from a consideration of the relationship between governance
configuration and a set of hospital performance indicators, Alexander et al. (1988) and
Weiner and Alexander (1933) have developed a conceptual model of nonprofit hospital
governance that incorporates corporate and philanthropic approaches. The philan-
thropic governance model tends to be attractive to nonprofit institutions. Out of 54
community hospitals in Tennessee that are follow a philanthropic model, 35 are owned
by nonprofit organizations. By the same token, corporate hospital governance is asso-
ciated with entrepreneurship. Out of 60 hospitals in Tennessee that follow a corporate
model, 23 are owned by for-profit hospitals. Nonprofit, for-profit, and public hospitals
make an effort to adapt to the current dynamic environments that hospitals confront.
Alexander, Morlock, and Gifford (1988), Weiner and Alexander (1993) and Kim
(2007) have compared philanthropic and corporate governance models in terms of
board size, heterogeneity, percentage of internal directors, level of CEO participation
on governing boards, the extent of the CEO’s accountability to governing boards, term
limitations, governing board compensation, and strategic activity. Boards that adopt the
philanthropic governance model tend to be larger than those that follow the corporate
governance model. They also tend to represent broad interests internally as well as
externally (Pfeffer, 1972). Boards that follow the corporate governance model are not
only relatively smaller in size but also focus on the more traditional functions of orga-
nizations (Ewell, 1987). There has been a shift in nonprofit hospitals in recent years
from the larger board size of the philanthropic model to the smaller board size of the
corporate governance model (Gu et al., 2010).
The degree of heterogeneity of a governing board is assessed by considering mem-
bers’ age, gender, ethnic background, and expertise. Boards that favor the philanthropic
model will tend be more heterogeneous than those that embrace the corporate governance
model given that the philanthropic governance model places emphasis on addressing a
wide range of interests of internal and external stakeholders. Organizations that favor a
corporate governance model are more likely to reflect greater homogeneity of expertise
(Alexander et al., 1988).
Boards that favor the corporate governance model also tend have a larger number
of internal directors than those that favor the philanthropic governance model, and 
this is because the former focus more on the internal dynamics of their organization
than on community relations or outreach programs. Boards that adhere to the corporate
governance model tend to achieve greater correspondence between organizational
management and policymaking (Mace, 1971). CEOs serve as a bridge between manage-
ment and the governing board in the organization. CEOs on the governing board play a
more critical role in the corporate governance model than the philanthropic governance
model, since CEOs in the corporate governance model have more power vis-à-vis the
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governing board. The ability to exercise influence on the governing board is considered
critical to improving the linkage between policy making and management, lessening
conflict between management and the board of directors, and facilitating appointments
to the board of directors that share the same organizational philosophy as the board
(Alexander et al., 1988; Johnson, 1986). The duties of the governing board include
developing organizational policies and engaging in strategic decision-making, while
top management is responsible for carrying out daily operations. In organizations that
adopt the corporate governance model, the distinction between strategic decision making
and the daily operations of the organization ought in theory to be more clear-cut than in
organizations that follow the philanthropic governance model (Mace, 1976), and this
distinction between management and the governing board should improve organiza-
tional operation and performance through checks and balances (Alexander et al., 1988).
Regarding term service on a governing board, members of boards of directors of
organizations that favor the philanthropic model may serve on the board indefinitely
and are often allowed to appoint their successors, while boards that follow the corporate
governance model restrict the terms of the governing board to prevent the governing
board from becoming too conservative and stale (Pfeffer, 1973; Johnson, 1986; Kovner,
1978). In terms of the compensation for governing board services, boards following
the philanthropic governance model do not compensate members for their service,
while those following the corporate governance model pay the director of the board
for his or her services (Alexander et al., Gifford, 1988; Rehm & Alexander, 1986). In
the current health care environment, hospitals whose boards have adopted the corporate
governance model are more likely those that have adopted the philanthropic model to
be concerned with the competitive position of a hospital (Alexander et al., 1988;
Alexander & Lee, 2006).
RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA
Research Method: DEA
To measure the performance of board governance in community hospitals in 
Tennessee, this study used DEA. DEA is a nonparametric mathematical programming
methodology that measures technical efficiency. Here we use data on input and output
variables of each hospital to build a piecewise linear surface over the data points.1 This
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1. Technical and methodological overviews are provided by Seiford and Thrall (1990), Lovell
(1993), Ali and Seiford (1993), and Charnes, Cooper, Lewin, and Seiford (1995).
frontier surface is created by the solution of a sequence of linear programming problems.
The degree of technical inefficiency of each hospital, that is, the distance between the
observed data and the frontier, is measured as a by-product of the frontier production
analysis.
Some benefits of DEA are the following: it does not need to specify a mathematical
form for the production function, it reveals relationships that remain obscured in other
methodologies, it can handle multiple inputs and outputs, it can be used with any input-
output measurement, and the sources of inefficiency can be evaluated and measured
quantitatively for every evaluated unit (Cook & Zhu, 2005). Further, DEA is explicitly
capable of evaluating the multiproduct nature of hospitals (Rosko, 1990). Due to the
characteristics that make DEA powerful, many of studies (Roh, Moon, & Jung, 2013;
Hollingsworth & Parkin, 1995; Ferrer, Rosko, & Valmanis, 2006; Linna, Häkkinen, &
Magnussen, 2006) have used DEA to measure hospital performance.
Since being proposed by Farrell (1957) and named by Charnes, Cooper, and
Rhodes (1978), DEA has been extended and applied by input and output orientations.
The typical DEA can incorporate both the Charnes, Cooper, and Rhodes (CCR) DEA
model (Charnes et al., 1978) and the Banker, Charnes, and Cooper (BCC) DEA model
(Banker et al., 1984). Charnes et al. (1978) proposed an input-oriented DEA method
(CCR DEA model) that measures the efficiency of input to obtain a constant output. 
In other words, the CCR DEA model presumes the frontier surface in pursuing the
maximum possible proportional reduction in input with output held constant for each
DMU. This model assumes efficiency for the DMU to be the weighted linear combi-
nation of its outputs divided by the weighted linear combination of its inputs, subject
to the constraint that the efficiency is between 0 and 1 for each DMU. All weights are
restricted to be nonnegative. The linear programming problem that is solved for the 
j-th hospital in the input-oriented DEA model is as follows:
M
Max θ = ∑ umym0 (1)
m=1
N M N
s.t. ∑ vnxn0 = 1, ∑ umymj – ∑ vnxnj ≤ 0, vn, um ≥ 0
n=1 m=1 n=1
where
xn is the vector of input quantities for j-th hospital,
ym is the vector of output quantities for j-th hospital,
vn is the vector of the weight of input,
um is the vector of the weight of output.
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The CCR DEA model is what is known as the constant return to scale (CRS) DEA
model, since the resulting technology will be CRS technology. The BCC DEA model,
which is the output-oriented DEA model, attempts to seek the maximum proportional
increase in output production with input held constant. This model extends the CCR
DEA model to account for variable return to scale (VRS) situations. When the decision-
making units do not all operate at optimal scale, the use of CRS specifications results
in measures of technical efficiency that are described by scale efficiencies. Therefore,
the BCC DEA model allows us to calculate technical efficiency devoid of these scale
efficiencies effects (Coelli, 1996).
The linear programming of the BBC DEA model is as follows:
M
Max θ = ∑ umym0 – η0 (2)
m=1
N M N
s.t. ∑ vnxn0 = 1, ∑ umymj – ∑ vnxnj – η0 ≤ 0, vn, um ≥ 0
n=1 m=1 n=1
where
xn is the vector of input quantities for j-th hospital,
ym is the vector of output quantities for j-th hospital,
vn is the vector of the weight of input,
um is the vector of the weight of output,
η0 is return to scale.
Coelli (1996) has pointed out that “the output- and input-oriented models will estimate
exactly the same frontier and therefore, by definition, identify the same set of DMU’s
as being efficient. It is only the efficiency measures associated with the inefficient
DMU’s that may differ between the two methods.”
Data and Variables
Data for this study were derived from the annual reports from the Tennessee Depart-
ment of Health and surveys of hospital governance. After all the hospitals with missing
input and output variables were deleted, this dataset covered 125 general community
hospitals in Tennessee and contained hospital-level information on clinics and utiliza-
tion, as well as financial and organizational information. We surveyed all general com-
munity hospitals in Tennessee to determine what governance model each one followed.
This study is based on data from the fiscal years 2008 to 2012, and the unit of analysis
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is the hospital.
DEA permits flexibility in selecting input and output variables as well as results if
technical efficiency scores prove to be consistent across various input and output vari-
ables. Human resources and capital are critical variables in the production of health
care services in hospitals. This study selected two input variables in efficiency analysis:
bed occupancy and FTE (full-time equivalent). This study also selected four output
variables: procedures, outpatients, inpatients, and charity. Of the input variables, number
of beds indicates hospital size. Hospitals with more beds should realize economies of
scale more easily than hospitals with fewer beds. The number of FTEs is intended 
to reflect the volume and range of work undertaken by health care professionals in
hospitals. Regarding the output variables, procedures refer to medical procedures
involving an incision with instruments performed to repair damage or arrest disease in a
living body. The number of procedures reflects the capacity of the hospital. Outpatient
and inpatient numbers indicate an estimate of a hospital’s outpatient and inpatient
workloads. Charity care is the total amount of free health care provided to patients who
cannot pay for their health care services. The level of charity care reflects a hospital’s
core competency in delivering health care. Also, it serves as proxy for caseload mix.
Charity care is deflated using the Consumer Price Index (CPI) published by the U.S
Department of Labor. The CPI was scaled to 100 in 2008.
Table 1 shows the means and standard deviation of input and output variables from
2008 to 2012. Overall, means and standard deviation of input variables were steady
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Table1. Descriptive Statistics (M=125)
Procedures Outpatients Inpatients Charity($) Bed FTE
2008 22,420 73,372 28,648 2,079,214 164 628(27,678)* (90,184) (36,134) (7,414,119) (168) (873)
2009 24,920 68,693 30,275 2,555,900 163 639(29,197) (85,916) (38,270) (10,170,053) (166) (888)
2010 29,841 72,080 30,511 3,291,362 163 639(40,813) (95,018) (38,894) (12,401,480) (166) (915)
2011 27,739 73,778 31,628 4,171,697 161 639(33,711) (102,378) (41,796) (16,980,877) (166) (940)
2012 29,129 74,031 30,585 6,807,091 163 637(34,992) (108,668) (39,892) (21,530,019) (167) (986)
2008-2012 26,810 72,391 30,295 3,781,053 163 636(33,688) (96,755) (39,040) (14,672,439) (167) (921)
* standard deviation.
during the period. Output variables increased steadily during this period. Standard
deviations of output variables followed a similar pattern. That is, community hospitals
in Tennessee treated more patients on average during this period.
FINDINGS
Table 2 reports annual technical efficiency estimates from 2008 to 2102 of the 125
Tennessee community hospitals in our study. Overall technical efficiency is the ability
of an organization to convert multiple input variables into output variables. A hospital
is considered to be technically inefficient if it operates below the production possibili-
ty frontier. Input/output configuration as well as the size of operations makes it possi-
ble to use the measurement of overall technical efficiency to determine inefficiency.
Scale efficiency and pure technical efficiency can be adduced via the decomposition
of the overall technical efficiency and are mutually exclusive and nonadditive compo-
nents. This decomposition provides insight into the sources of inefficiencies. Pure
technical efficiency, which estimates the efficient frontier under the assumption of a
VRS scenario, reflects managerial performance in providing health care services and
so is used as an index to capture managerial performance. Scale efficiency is the ratio
of overall technical efficiency to pure technical efficiency. Scale efficiency reflects the
ability of management to select the optimum amount of resources or to choose the
scale of production that will achieve the expected production level. A hospital’s being
too small or too large may be a cause of technical efficiency.
Scale efficiency takes two forms: decreasing return to scale and increasing return to
scale. Increasing return to scale means the hospital is too small for its scale of operations,
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Table 2. All models (M=125)
INCRS INVRS INSCL
2008 0.519 0.666 0.795
2009 0.407 0.599 0.717
2010 0.490 0.623 0.794
2011 0.343 0.612 0.592
2012 0.579 0.689 0.844
2008-2012 0.468 0.638 0.748
INCRS: technical efficiency from CRS DEA
INVRS: technical efficiency from VRS DEA
INSCL: scale efficiency = INCRS/INVRS
while decreasing return-to-scale means that the hospital is too large to take full advan-
tages of scale and has a supraoptimum scale size. When a hospital operates at constant
return to scale, a hospital is scale efficient. Pure technical efficiency, recorded in table
2, is the primary source of inefficiency in Tennessee community hospitals. The average
overall technical efficiency was 46.5% for the 2008-2012 time period, while the aver-
ages of pure technical efficiency and scale efficiency were 63.8% and 74.8 %, respec-
tively, for the same period. Scale efficiency enables management to choose the optimum
size of input variables in order to determine the scale of production that will result in
the expected production level.
Hospital governance, the process of steering the overall function and effective per-
formance of a hospital by defining the hospital’s mission, setting its objectives, and
supporting and monitoring their realization at the operational level (Flynn, 2002), is
considered to influence hospital performance, but there is no consensus exactly what
its effects are. Still, it would be safe to say that in order to survive in a rapidly changing
health care environment, hospitals need to understand the characteristics of an effective
governing board and incorporate strategies to strengthen performance. The main purpose
of this study is to explore the relationship between the types of governing boards and
hospital performance. Studies that demonstrate the relationship between the characteris-
tics of governing boards and hospital performance are beneficial to health care stake-
holders, such as health care managers, public policy makers, patients, and creditors.
In order to measure the effects of governance on the performance of the 125 com-
munity hospitals in Tennessee we surveyed, we draw on Alexander et al.’s (1988) and
Weiner and Alexander’s (1993) classification of hospitals governing boards as either
philanthropic or corporate in nature. Some studies (Alexander et al., 1988, Pfeffer, 1973;
Johnson, 1986; Kovner, 1978; Rehm & Alexander, 1986; Alexander & Lee, 2006)
found that hospitals that operated according to a corporate governance model were
more financially efficient than hospitals that operated according to a philanthropic
model. Tables 3 and 4 report the performance of corporate governance hospitals and
philanthropic governance hospitals among community hospitals in Tennessee.
This study found that the average overall technical performance was higher for
hospitals that follow a corporate governance model than for hospitals that follow a
philanthropic governance model; our results indicate that the average overall technical
efficiency of hospitals that adopt a corporate governance model in Tennessee was
about 8.8% higher than that of their counterparts. The average of pure technical effi-
ciency is 76.0% in philanthropic governance hospitals and 75.4% in corporate gover-
nance hospitals, while the average of scale efficiency in philanthropic governance hos-
pitals and corporate governance hospitals is 79.8% and 82.2%, respectively, for the
2008-2012 period.
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CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
Hospitals are a critical part of health care delivery in the United States. In 2016,
4,926 community hospitals filled 786,874 hospital beds and admitted 33,066,720
patients (AHA, 2016). More than 1 in 10 who came through the emergency room
were admitted to a hospital. Also, hospitals represent one of the largest employers in
the community. Health care spending for hospitals was more than $970 billion in 2014
(CMS, 2016). Despite this stature and strength, the hospital industry confronts massive
and disruptive change. One out of three hospitals will close or merge with another
health care provider by 2020 (Houle & Fleece, 2012).
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education
Reconciliation Act of 2010 (ACA) strives to improve health care quality and reduce
health care costs in the United States by encouraging hospitals, physicians, and other
health care providers to charge patients through an integrated delivery system. The
changes wrought by the ACA have given hospitals an opportunity to compete more
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Table 3. Philanthropic Governance Model (M=54)
INCRS INVRS INSCL
2008 0.532 0.666 0.806
2009 0.449 0.611 0.756
2010 0.513 0.669 0.775
2011 0.571 0.704 0.819
2012 0.584 0.701 0.834
2008-2012 0.530 0.760 0.798 
Table 4. Corporate Governance Model (M=54)
INCRS INVRS INSCL
2008 0.504 0.661 0.771
2009 0.692 0.840 0.826
2010 0.667 0.802 0.836
2011 0.547 0.686 0.806
2012 0.679 0.782 0.870
2008-2012 0.618 0.754 0.822 
strongly against other health care providers in improving health care quality and lessen-
ing duplication of health care services and unnecessary administrative costs. With
increasing competition among health care providers, it is critical to understand the 
features of hospital governing boards; they are a core component in hospital governance,
since they have a legal responsibility for establishing goals and objectives and super-
vising management performance.
Previous studies of the relationship between hospital governance and hospital 
performance have focused on a single aspect such as financial performance, respon-
siveness, equity, outcomes, and accessibility. In using DEA, this study has tried to take
a more comprehensive view. Hospitals serve multiple functions. They diagnose and
treat the sick and injured, prevent illness, and promote health. They educate health
care professionals who will work in the health services community and conduct
research with clinical trials for new drugs and devices as well as nonclinical research
on such matters as how to enhance hospital processes though quality improvement. In
taking these multiple functions into account, this study found that hospitals that follow
a corporate governance model are more efficient than hospitals that follow a philan-
thropic governance model.
This study has focused on the importance of hospital governing boards by ascer-
taining which types of governing boards influence hospital performance in Tennessee.
In exploring the relationship between hospital governance and performance, this study
offers a more comprehensive measurement of health care governance and quality of
management than that previous studies. To understand the dynamics of hospital gover-
nance, further studies using qualitative research methods need to conducted.
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